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Abstract
Nationalism seems a persistent ideology in academia as 
much as in politics; despite the fact that it has been shown that 
nationalism is deeply unjust for minorities. A case for national 
identity is often invoked to supplement liberalism regarding the 
inner difficulties that liberal theories have to explain their mem-
bership, assure stability and produce endorsement. So, it seems 
that national identity may also be required for justice. While this 
controversy continues, I argue that a different approach is avail-
able. We can define a conception of legitimacy independently 
from a conception of justice, and then ask what legitimacy re-
quires from our national allegiances. If everything goes well, 
much of the controversy from justice disappears as we find that 
the case for cultural nationalism may be illegitimate for liberal 
democracies.
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Resumen
Parece que el nacionalismo es una ideología persistente en la 
academia y en la política a pesar de que parece profundamente 
injusto para las minorías. El caso de la identidad nacional es 
frecuentemente defendido para complementar al liberalismo 
con respecto a los problemas internos que tienen las teorías 
liberales para explicar la membresía, asegurar la estabilidad y 
producir el apoyo. Por ello, parece que la justicia requiere el 
apoyo a la identidad nacional. Mientras que esta controversia 
puede continuar, yo argumento que existe una aproximación 
alternativa. Podemos definir una concepción de legitimidad 
independiente de una concepción de justicia y después 
preguntarnos qué requiere la legitimidad de nuestras lealtades 
nacionales. Si todo sale bien, mucho de la controversia desde la 
justicia desaparece mientras nos encontramos con que el caso 
en favor del nacionalismo cultural puede ser ilegítimo para las 
democracias liberales.
Palabras clave: nacionalismo, justicia distributiva, legitimidad, 
auto-determinación política, derechos de las minorías, derechos 
de las mayorías.  
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Nationalism once again. Again, someone like Donald Trump is 
promising to solve the main problems of America by excluding minorities 
and by isolating America from the exterior. Again, someone like David 
Cameron is blaming multiculturalism, globalization and integration for 
the fact that terrorists are now recruited in liberal democracies, from our 
sons and neighbours, even within middle and upper educated classes.1 
Again the three main left-winged parties in Mexico (PRI, PRD and 
MORENA) are campaigning with slogans associated with the doctrine 
of revolutionary nationalism. But why nationalism over and over again? 
I am not going to pretend it is in any way surprising that nationalist 
sensibilities arise in the middle of a crisis. To look for support in the 
ones we find closer to us, in the nearest and the dearest, might be just an 
automatic response.2 What surprises me I must confess is that—despite 
its bad reputation in terms of colonialism, authoritarianism, and racism 
—nationalist policies are still invoked by government officials and even 
by scholars as an innovative solution to old problems.
In this paper, I want to address what kind of relationship a liberal 
democracy ought to have with nationalism, what is the appropriate 
relationship between nationalism and nation-state, and how pertinent or 
illusory is this relation in times of crisis (or at any time for that matter). In 
particular, I want to ask if nationalism is able to supplement liberalism 
about the problem that traditionally liberalism has to generate its own 
support (Rawls, 2001: 89, 181) and explain who is a member (Whelan, 
1983). I will argue that, at least for the case of liberal democracies it is 
overall illegitimate to resort to certain kinds of nationalism in times of 
crisis.
Nationalism is the doctrine of one state one nation: it holds the idea 
that the nation (culture, language and/or identity) should coincide—as 
much as possible—with the state.3 Nationalism is often associated with 
oppression, manipulation and conflict because it submerges individual 
1  My account of the Prime Minister’s ideas has been taken mostly from his 
speech on multiculturalism February the 5th at the Munich security conference 
and his speech on the Big Society in Liverpool July 19th.
2  About the many challenges posed by nationalism and identity to 
political and social life, see the illuminating essay by Gracia (2005). As this essay 
is mainly conceptual, many applied problems will lay outside of its scope.  
3  See Anderson (2006). 
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identity within a national whole; it gives elites or political leaders potential 
opportunities to manipulate or control the masses; and because it feeds 
beliefs of ethnic, moral or cultural superiority that, in turn, justifies in 
the eye of the fanatic the forcible subjugation, annexation or exploitation 
of “lesser peoples” (Hobsbawm, 1990; Özkirimli, 2000). So many writers 
wish to conclude that nationalism is incompatible in principle with 
liberal democracies (Mason, 1999: 263; Abizadeh, 2002; Lægaard, 2006: 
401; Wellman & Cole, 2011: 52). Yet right now for many, nationalism 
seems like a fresh solution. Most of us place a great expressive value 
in our mother language and believe that our personal identity is to a 
certain extent shaped by the culture prevailing where we were born and 
raised. We find a strong symbolic value in the landscape. We believe that 
sharing language and identity helps us to feel at home along with those 
with whom we share the social space. There is also a strong conviction 
that this cultural self-identification gives all of us powerful incentives 
to comply with the heavy burdens of participation that contemporary 
liberal democracies impose upon us. Because of this, many writers think 
that nationalist identity and nationalist policies are desperately needed 
to supplement liberal democracies (Gellner, 1983; Miller, 1995; Tamir, 
1993; Gams, 1998).
So why, if nationalism is prima facie unjust, does it keep coming back 
again and again? And at the same time, why if nationalism is so evidently 
needed does it seem so hard to accommodate with the requirements 
of liberal values and justice? It seems to me that what justice requires 
from our national allegiances is largely undetermined. Nationalism 
poses a dilemma: many examples could suggest that nationalist policies 
may be just and unjust at the same time. This dilemma is the subject 
of this paper; but I will not try to decide what justice requires from 
our national allegiances though. My aim will instead be to find a way 
around the dilemma. While it seems difficult to decide matters of justice 
and nationalism, we may begin by deciding what sorts of nationalism 
are legitimate for the case of liberal democracies. Once we know what 
is illegitimate about nationalism, many cases will become uninteresting 
or unattractive from the perspective of justice. So, the dilemma of 
nationalism will deflate as a consequence. I will argue then that most 
forms of cultural nationalism are illegitimate. 
The agenda of this paper runs as follows. First, I will illustrate the 
main intuition around the idea that nationalist policies are required by 
justice and the main intuitions in the opposite direction. Then, I will 
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lay down operative conceptions of justice and legitimacy explaining 
in which areas they are co-extensional and in which areas they are 
conceptually different. Later in the third part I will use the conception 
of legitimacy (as independent with justice) to argue that cultural 
nationalism is illegitimate for the case of liberal democracies.
Before jumping into the distinctions and arguments, three 
clarifications are needed. First, it is important to note that in this paper I 
focus in cultural forms of nationalism rather than in ethnic forms which 
seem categorically unjust. The kind of nationalism I’m interested in is not 
grounded in the myth of common descent. It rather grounds a prima facie 
case for political self-determination in the purported ethical dimension 
of the relationship between the individual process of self-identification 
and identity with the shared culture prevalent or dominant within the 
state (Abizadeh, 2012: 873). 
Second, legitimacy is the virtue of justified exercises of political 
power. As such, it has various dimensions. There is an exclusively 
empirical and contingent dimension about what people in fact accept 
as justified exercise of power and about what the support of people 
in fact provide to certain institutions; no matter how just or fair these 
institutions are. This is the kind of legitimacy that political scientists 
measure with polls of perception. If we care only about this dimension, 
we will end up with the claim that people often regard as legitimate 
what is essentially wrong, as when fascist politicians reach office 
through democratic institutions. In this paper, I assume that this de facto 
legitimacy is not the whole picture and that a more holistic approach 
encompasses both relevant facts and moral virtues. Indeed, legitimacy 
has also an evaluative dimension because morality largely helps us 
to determine both what exercises of political power we can accept as 
morally justified, all things considered; and what exercises of political 
power could be morally justified (Williams, 2005; Simmons, 1999; 
Waldron, 1993; Wellman, 1996).
Third, I start with two assumptions about the moral character of 
liberal democracies in the hope that today these won’t be too problematic. 
First, democracy is more than majority rule. Majority rule is limited by 
minority’s rights. Minorities have certain rights that must be protected 
such as freedom of speech and freedom of worship. The second 
assumption is that equal concern (which is among these essential rights) 
is in principle more than political equality and equality of opportunities. 
For instance, citizens need to be able to think about themselves as a valid 
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source of legitimate reasonable claims instead of thinking themselves 
as submitted to fortune. (Rawls, 2001: 20) That means that society must 
provide the conditions for everyone to be a member without losing her 
dignity.
1. Approaches to Nationalism
These clarifications above allow me to make two kinds of 
distinctions to organize the discussion of this section. Distinctions of the 
first kind separate different ways to support nationalism within a liberal 
democracy. Distinctions of the second kind separate different research 
approaches to nationalism.
There are at least two ways in which, it seems to me, it might be 
possible for a liberal democracy to be a nationalist state (and remain a 
liberal democracy of some kind). First there is the familiar nationalism. 
All liberal democracies are a bit nationalist to the extent they are 
organized as nation-states. For the last 200 years, liberal democracies 
have been intimately linked to the nation-state. This kind of nationalism 
is the remainder of a long process of de-nationalization of nationalist 
institutions of the nation-state undertaken by liberalism, democratic 
theory and multiculturalism (Raz, 1998). But in a substantive nationalist 
state, which is the second way a liberal democracy could be nationalist, 
the comprehensive culture of a dominant group is to be expanded to 
everyone within the state. 
Now, this kind of substantive nationalism raises at least two main 
concerns: one empirical and one philosophical. The empirical concern 
has to do with the value and importance of certain social goods that 
allegedly nationalism allows to achieve and/or protect. Typically, this 
instrumental case for nationalism has the form “In order to protect or 
preserve X we may justifiably protect and cultivate national culture and 
self-identification with that culture”. X typically represents economy, 
markets, productivity, security, trust, solidarity, political will, and/or 
cultural distinctiveness. In order to address concerns of the first kind 
we need to ask: is establishing nationalist institutions or arrangements 
really necessary and/or sufficient to secure X? The problem is that each 
of these empirical claims about the positive contribution of nationalist 
institutions to well-being is likely to be challenged by evidence in the 
opposite direction, showing that multicultural, pluralist, multinational 
liberal democracies perform better or at least the same in many ways 
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and tend to be more peaceful, competitive, and productive. High living 
standards of liberal democracies, such as Canada and Switzerland, are 
paradigmatic. 
The philosophical concern focuses rather in what justice requires 
from our group allegiances. We need to ask: do those who seek to 
establish substantive nationalist institutions have a moral right to 
do it? Or more specifically, we may ask as well, has a majority the 
right to have certain culture established as the culture that shapes 
the institutions and policies of the state? Or similarly, is the majority 
owed that kind of advantage over other groups? Notice that empirical 
concerns above won’t by themselves address conclusively our second 
philosophical concern because they won’t by themselves clarify the 
nature or extension of the putative rights and claims of those subjected 
to nationalist institutions or social arrangements. Even if the empirical 
survey vindicates the instrumental case, we have to know if liberal 
democracies have the moral right to protect X by nationalist means. 
These distinctions serve the purpose of narrowing the scope of our 
discussion to the philosophical concerns raised by substantive forms of 
nationalism. So we can now spell out the question in this way: must 
a liberal democracy be a mere civic familiar nation-state or can it be a 
substantive nationalist nation-state as Mr. Trump seems to foresee for 
USA or as the left-winged parties campaign for in Mexico?
There are familiar examples of both kinds of states. Canada is a 
civic nation-state which upholds familiar civic nationalist institutions. 
Canada contains a variety of ethnic groups and it is in fact formed by 
two linguistic nations. The Québécoise for instance enjoy a great deal of 
independence and self-determination. Along with the Anglo-Canadian 
majority and the French-Canadian minority, there are several minority 
cultural-groups. Israel is an example of a substantially nationalist 
nation-state. Israel accepts Jews coming from all cultural backgrounds 
but identifies itself, in its basic laws as a Jewish state. In Israel, you can 
marry only under the Jewish faith and you need to appeal for the law 
of return in order to be granted with citizenship. The United Kingdom 
and Mexico now still fall somewhere in between, as most of liberal 
democracies do indeed. They contain several nations, but these nations 
in practice share a common language. Their basic law is civic in form, 
but the society is still traditionally structured following pervasive 
cultural values and unwritten rules. They are mostly democratic, but 
their politicians, in times of crisis play with the idea to push British and 
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Mexican institutions to a greater coincidence with the culture of the 
majority, claiming that this will help to sort some of the problems they 
face. The USA also lays somewhere in between. It has in principle liberal 
and democratic institutions suitable for a nation composed initially 
by immigrants; yet from time to time the exceptionalist doctrine of a 
“special destiny” that depicts the USA as the “shining city upon the hill” 
is invoked.4 
Coming back to Mr. Trump´s campaign, he believes that 
unemployment, the decline of average income and household’s debt 
are the result of immigration and America´s integration to the globe. So 
he promises to make America great again by building a wall along the 
Mexican border, denying Muslims entry into the United States hoping 
that isolation from global economy and diminishment of immigration 
could help to nurture and protect American traditional values and 
culture. In my view this should be worthy of the most serious attention 
because it will definitively incline the USA—and some other countries 
under similar circumstances—to the side of substantive nationalist-states 
instead to the side of merely familiar civic nation-states, moving away 
in fact, from the direction that the former multicultural and globalist 
policies have recommended (Raz, 1998:195). 
2. What justice requires from national allegiances?
Let me repeat the question at hand: must a liberal democracy be 
a mere familiar civic nation-state or can it be a substantive nationalist 
nation-state as Mr. Trump seems to foresee for USA? One way to 
approach this question is to ask what justice requires from our national 
allegiances. Defenders of substantive nationalism (Gellner, 1983; Tamir, 
1993; Ignatieff, 1994; Miller, 1995; Gams, 1998) believe that cultural 
identity has the kind of value that allows people to cherish and cultivate 
the attributes that distinguish the group from any other, because it is this 
distinctive character which allows the production of certain important 
social goods that are unique to the character of the group. That may 
even require states to exclude outsiders in order to protect that character 
(Miller, 2015: 10). In this section I want to show to what extent the 
discussion from justice is too controversial to be taken up without help. 
4  Many thanks to Francisco García González (ITESM, Mexico City 
Campus) for showing this to me. 
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In the next section I will argue that we could supplement the discussion 
from justice with considerations of legitimacy provided that we define 
legitimacy independently from justice.
The main feature of this defence is that the case for group-partiality 
within a nation is not only based upon the idea of the instrumental 
value of culture, identity and nationality.5 Rather nationality is a special 
relationship because it is also intrinsically valuable (Miller, 1995: 163). 
David Miller is probably the most prominent defender of nationalism. 
According to him, sharing the same culture has an intrinsic value because 
it implies sharing an ethical bond of some kind (Miller, 1995: 40). On this 
view, nations have a special ethical dimension, because members share 
an ethically meaningful bond insofar they are part of a community with 
historical continuity that stretches back into the past and forward into 
the future. During that time this community is symbolically connected 
to a particular territory, its landscapes, climate conditions and specific 
resources that model a distinctive way of life. Members share a strong 
belief and mutual commitment in the existence and conservation of that 
distinct community because their own identity is shaped to a certain 
extent by this identity; and as a result, their membership has an active 
character; which means that the community is created and shaped by 
the results of actions and decisions taken by past and current members 
(Miller, 1995: 27). Thus, all these different ethical dimensions together 
(group-bonding, geography, history self-identification and culture) 
allow the production of certain important social goods that are unique 
to the national character and at the same time ground a moral right to 
political self-determination. 
Now we can see in what sense nationalists claim that nationalist 
institutions are not only just but even required by justice. The doctrine of 
“one nation, one state” makes no sense if the nation in question has not 
got good claims of political self-determination. According to substantive 
nationalists, since the culture of the nation offers to its members among 
5  Instrumental reasons are provided to argue that in a liberal democracy 
conditions are such that the requirements of social justice and deliberative 
democracy make cooperation and compliance very demanding. At the heart of 
what most politicians and scholars state, is the conviction that it is very difficult 
for liberal and democratic values to take root in society without the pervasive 
effect of the institutions of nationhood and their constant nation-building 
activities. (Gellner, 1983; Miller, 1995; Tamir, 1993; Ignatieff, 1994; Gams, 1998).
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other things ways of socialization, horizons of choice and value, and 
means of self-identification, members living in the community have 
a legitimate interest in controlling their own culture, because this is a 
matter of members deciding about their common fate. The legitimate 
interest and the practical need they have in deciding about their 
faith as community grounds what we consider good claims for self-
determination (Miller, 1995: 63).
So far so good, but we can find good reasons of justice in the 
opposite direction (Abizadeh, 2002; Lægaard, 2006: 401; Wellman & 
Cole, 2011: 52). Two of them will suffice. First, there is, it seems to me, a 
prima facie conviction that democracy is more than majority rule and that 
members of a community need to be able to accept the dominion of the 
state over them without losing their dignity. It is not possible for each 
citizen to see the government as his government, unless the government 
shows to each citizen an equal concern and equal respect. (Dworkin, 
2001: 205). It seems deeply unjust to ask full compliance and cooperation 
from members of cultural and linguistic minorities and at the same time 
ask them to endure a society where the institutions are shaped in such 
a way that work in an enormous disadvantage for them because they 
allow to “feel at home” only to members of the majority. It seems we are 
left with two possibilities. Either nationalism requires equal standing 
for all cultural groups, including those cultural minorities, defeating its 
own purpose of protecting the culture of the majority; or nationalism 
begs the question because it is presupposing the kind of priority that it 
intended to ground, which, as a result, undermines its case of justice. 
Second, we can distinguish societal culture from nationalist culture. 
Societal culture is the shared culture of a societal group which is used to 
socialize new members of the society (Margalit & Raz, 1990: 443-7). In 
contrast, nationalist culture is a societal culture nationalist in character. 
Members of the group will acquire societal culture typically as a matter of 
belonging because this is what socializes them as members of the group; 
whereas it seems that nationalist culture is a matter of achievement. 
To be a good Mexican is a matter of achievement but to be a Mexican is 
not. In this sense, it seems to me that the principle of nationalist self-
determination is incompatible with liberalism because it is grounded in 
controversial meta-ethical particularism and nationalist perfectionism, 
and once nationalism gives up these claims, it becomes civic familiar 
nationalism which is unproblematic. The idea that nationalism is the 
sole or the best social structure for public morality and individual 
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socialization is contingent upon finding empirical proof of both the 
instrumental-value claims and the psychological or sociological claim 
that individuals are better socialized under nationalist institutions. So, 
the connection that nationalists establish from what they call “national 
culture” to the right to extend the culture of the dominant group to 
everyone is never established (Abizadeh, 2002).
To be sure, notice that nationalists confuse the dominion that a state 
legitimately exercises over citizens from whom it extracts allegiance 
and whose will it seeks to represent; with the process through which 
culture gets shaped, formed, nourished and protected. It is not the 
fact that a community is nationalist in its sensibility, character and in 
its culture what justifies political self-determination; but rather it is 
the fact that a group has the kind of social structure and organization 
suitable for socialization (Margalit & Raz, 1990). But socialization could 
be undertaken by using many different values and culture. Socialization 
need not befall only by using nationalist culture or nationalist institutions. 
What is needed is a social structure6 in order to make at least the relevant 
features of the culture accessible for people to be socialized (as members 
of that particular group). For instance, we can think in cultural groups 
which are multicultural or cosmopolitan in character (Margalit & Raz, 
1990: 447, 451). Furthermore, if the purpose of a shared culture is to 
socialize every member within the society so they can belong; in fact, 
nationalist culture defeats the purpose of culture by alienating members 
of the state which are not members of the majority. On closer inspection, 
an argument needs to be provided to show that claims of culture become 
claims of justice.7 Without it it seems deeply unjust to impose nationalist 
institutions and culture to groups with a different national character.
I believe this leaves open one important distinction to be made. We 
should distinguish on one side between political self-determination and 
cultural self-determination (Rasmussen, 2009). Nations are not the only 
6  I believe this imply the organizational and authority potential capacity 
to build up institutions. But this idea needs to be unpacked further.
7  Miller himself abdicates this premise (Miller, 2009: 303). Miller realized 
that distributive justice could apply to people engaged in many types of 
relationships, and not only to relationships established by means of shared 
culture. In the same way, there can be several motivations to enthusiastically 
comply with the demands of distributive justice; nationalist solidarity is not the 
sole source of normative motivation.
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groups with good claims of self-determination; they are not the only case 
of political self-determination as we know for sure because there are far 
more national groups than nation-states. But nations might indeed be 
a specific case of cultural self-determination. It seems to me that being 
interested in something generally does not mean that we have to elevate 
that interest into policy and institutions that demand obedience. The 
legitimate interest that people have in their culture does not ground 
directly a claim for political self-determination. 
Yet again, the intuition behind substantive forms of nationalism 
is indeed powerful and compelling. We all can agree that people 
have a fundamental interest in what government does as they have a 
fundamental interest in what other people’s attitude is towards their 
culture. If a majority wishes to have certain culture established as the 
culture that shapes the institutions and policies of the state; that will 
work as a very attractive advantage for them. Of course, this will 
work as well as a disadvantage for people with different identities 
associated with other different cultural groups. But then, they may 
argue, in a democracy often the advantages for the majority may 
result in disadvantages for some. If the majority wants a certain kind 
of environment and culture, then justice may require the minority to 
defer.  At the heart of what most politicians and scholars state, is the 
conviction that it is very difficult for liberal and democratic values to 
take root in society without the pervasive effect of the institutions of 
nationhood and their constant nation-building activities. And it seems 
difficult to figure out other ways to ensure virtuous citizens than the 
cultural means and forms recommended by substantive nationalism 
(Normand & Kymlicka, 2005: 212-214). These intrinsic reasons are often 
provided to argue that personal identity has such a structure that will be 
seriously harmed, if it is deprived of the kind of identity that nationhood 
provides. So, nationalism seems required by justice.
Now I am sure that many other good arguments can be invoked 
for each side. But my objective in this section has never been to settle 
the question. I wanted merely to demonstrate the dimension of the 
controversy. On the face of it, these considerations about justice and 
national allegiance cannot by themselves decide the core question: do 
those who seek to establish nationalist institutions have a moral right 
to do so? Nationalists rightly identify that liberal democracies have a 
moral character partly because of the cultural ties of those who belong. 
So, justice requires to protect identity and culture. But liberals recognize 
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that the majority has not gotten a moral right to all the advantages 
that come from having certain culture established as the culture that 
shapes the institutions and policies of the state. Thus, justice also 
requires us to qualify cultural rights so the minority groups can also 
belong; particularly if socialization can in fact be reached by means of 
more inclusive forms of culture. Accounts of distributive justice find it 
difficult to decide the extension of rights majorities have over minorities 
and immigrants from a different cultural background; as much as they 
find it difficult to decide the extension of minority rights and the rights 
of immigrants. I suspect that considerations of justice by themselves 
won’t conclusively address our second philosophical concern because 
they won’t by themselves clarify the nature, justification, and content of 
the putative moral rights of those involved in this controversy. 
3. Legitimacy and Justice
Nothing that I have said so far is equivalent to say that conceptually 
is not possible for any account of justice to adjudicate the case for or 
against nationalism. I suspect that less-ideal accounts of justice will 
be required in order to proceed case by case.8 But I won’t pursue the 
matter further. Instead I propose to take a step back and distinguish two 
different kinds of question. 
First, we could ask—as we have done in the last section—how much 
can the majority benefit from the saliency of their culture (when we 
protect and cultivate the culture of the majority) without harming other 
minority groups? When we ask questions like this we find ourselves in 
the terrain of justice, where we are required to distribute benefits and 
burdens among the people who participate in cooperation. But as we 
saw, we could also ask who can permissibly decide how much right has 
the majority to enjoy the benefits of extending their culture to the rest? 
Or what is the permissible scope and limits of these kinds of decisions? 
When we ask questions like these we find ourselves in the terrain of 
legitimacy.
The distinction is clear but not sharp. When we ask about what 
justice requires from national allegiances, we assess a distributive 
matter because we want to quantify the benefits and burdens produced 
by a particular ratio between the rights of majorities against the size of 
8  About non-ideal accounts of justice see Valentini (2012).
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the rights of minorities. But it seems that the answer to this question 
is undetermined because we lack a comprehensive theory about how 
group-rights and special obligations fit with each other. Indeed, what 
nationalists claim for their group, minority groups could claim for 
themselves. And justice finds it difficult to adjudicate formally these 
queries. But if we ask instead if liberal democracies have permission to 
limit or prevent the detrimental effects of extending the culture of the 
majority over the minorities (regardless this is just or not); or whether it 
is morally required or even morally permissible that the state enforces 
and protects the rights of the minorities (regardless this is just or unjust 
for the majorities); then we are not asking distributive questions any 
more. We have shifted the moral scope from distributive questions 
of how much, for the substantive moral questions of what is morally 
required and/or permissible.
To be sure, recall that justice and legitimacy are both political virtues 
because they both assess how well institutions protect the dignity 
of those over whom they extract obedience and allegiance and those 
over whom they exercise political power. The idea that institutions 
ought to protect dignity includes the requirement that political power 
should be consistent with the equal objective value of the life every 
one (Dworkin, 2011: 13-19). Then, the use of political power, coercion 
and the distribution of burdens and benefits should not be arbitrary; 
but it should be solely addressed to maintain the conditions that make 
possible in turn, participation, social cooperation, and compliance 
without requiring that any member or group give up their autonomy, 
authenticity, and self-respect. This means that coercive power needs to 
be exercised with equal concern. While the concept of justice determines 
what we owe to each other after a cooperative relationship; the concept 
of legitimacy is more primitive; because it serves as a moral background 
for justice. The concept of legitimacy determines who or what can 
guarantee a stable regimen able to secure order, protection, safety, trust, 
and cooperation (Williams, 2005: 3-5).
Now beware that general concepts need to be particularized and 
qualified into conceptions appropriate for each case.9 The case in hand 
are liberal democracies. In a liberal democracy to treat everyone with 
equal concern means that everyone could develop the minimum degree 
9  About the difference between concept and conceptions of justice see 
Rawls (1971: 5). For concepts of justice see Cohen (2008: 279).
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of capacities to take full part in the cooperative life of society. For instance, 
citizens need to be able to think about themselves as a valid source 
of legitimately reasonable claims, instead of thinking of themselves 
as being submitted to will and fortune (Rawls, 2001: 20). In a liberal 
democracy to protect the dignity of everyone means that participation, 
social cooperation, and compliance with the rule of law should not be 
seen as something that implies to accept the dominion of the state as a 
form of humiliation (Dworkin, 2011). It is not possible for each citizen 
to see the government as his government, unless the government shows 
each citizen an equal concern and equal respect (Dworkin, 2001: 205). 
That is why many philosophers see democratic legitimacy as the main 
conception of legitimacy appropriate for liberal democracies (Buchanan, 
2003; Cristiano, 2008; Peter, 2009; Estlund, 2008; Kolodny, 2014). At the 
same time justice as fairness is a conception of distributive justice greatly 
accepted as appropriate for liberal democracies too.
Notice that as powerful and compelling justice as fairness is, it 
remains—as constrained by Rawls himself—a conception of justice 
appropriate only for the case of the basic structure and the constitutional 
essentials. But the concept of justice requires many other conceptions 
of justice such as restorative justice, transgenerational justice, allocative 
justice; retributive justice etc., (Rawls, 2001: 10-11). I assume that the 
same happens with legitimacy and many conceptions of legitimacy may 
be invoked for other cases where democratic legitimacy is not required. 
I cannot discuss this here. But I suspect that much of the confusion 
between these two political virtues derives from the fact that in some 
cases legitimacy and justice may be co-extensional. Rawls was interested 
in the problem of justification and endorsement of a conception of justice 
(appropriate only for the basic structure) in conditions of pluralism. In 
that specific case, a conception of justice is grounded in liberal legitimacy 
(as public justification) and liberal legitimacy is at the end conceived as a 
form of political justice. Rawls is right in stressing that public institutions 
of a liberal democracy are just when they distribute the burdens and 
benefits from social cooperation as they are owed (Rawls, 2001: 5-6). He 
is also right to claim that in a liberal democracy legitimacy the authority 
of the state should be publicly justifiable (Rawls, 2000: 12). But in turn 
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authority is justified only when it is just. Therefore, the distance between 
justice and legitimacy is merely apparent for this case. 10
But legitimacy and justice are not co-extensional in every possible 
case even in liberal democracies, so they should be conceptually 
distinguished. This analysis of the conceptual relationship between 
the two, importantly explains why (i) in the conceptual literature 
about distributive justice for the basic structure of liberal democracies, 
the two concepts merge (Slate, 2015; Song, 2012; Rossi, 2014) and also 
(ii) why in many factual cases what is just may not be legitimate and 
what is legitimate may not be just.11 But for the purposes of this work 
10  I follow Sleat (2015); Rossi (2014); Song (2012); Peter (2008); Simmons 
(2001); in claiming that Rawls´ political liberalism overlaps the scope of legitimacy 
and justice as an argumentative tactic to deal with reasonable pluralism. This 
argumentative tactic becomes attractive because Rawls believes it is not possible 
to argue for justice as fairness in terms of the goodness of justice, without 
making it unacceptable for the citizens of a pluralistic society, since citizens have 
different and irreconcilable ideas about what is good and just. In A Theory of 
Justice Rawls argued for a conception of justice as fairness by explaining how 
justice is good (Song, 2012: 153-61). According to Rawls the primary role of his 
principles is to “specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good 
of those taking part of it. (Rawls, 1971: 4)” But Rawls came to accept that this 
justification was not available for everyone in a pluralistic society. The Rawlsean 
problem of justification of a theory of justice shifts then from an argument of 
the justness undertook by a comprehensive theory of morality to an argument 
of the legitimacy of justice as fairness capable to elucidate: “[…] in the light of 
what reasons and values—of what kind of a conception of justice—can citizens 
legitimately exercise that coercive power over one another? (Rawls, 2001: 41)”. 
That’s why for that specific problem as framed by Rawls, justice and legitimacy 
overlap. But supporting a conception of justice in conditions of reasonable 
pluralism is not the sole problem of political theory. Applied ethics and political 
theory raise many other problems so we must resist the tendency to always 
overlap legitimacy and justice. 
11  Examples of unjust legitimate exercise of political power are sadly 
familiar to everyone. Women´s right to vote wasn’t legal until the late 19th 
century, but that fact didn’t by itself mean that Finland, Sweden or the UK 
were illegitimate. Illegitimate exercises of just political power are far less 
ubiquitous but not unseen. Suppose that the best lawyers of the world arrive 
to the uncontroverted conclusion that the Swedish system of law and political 
arrangement is the most perfect in the globe. This means, to a certain extent, 
that it is just. To prove it they convince the president of Nicaragua to implement 
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it is sufficient to say that justice assess distributions and their effects; 
and legitimacy assesses the kind of social order and the moral rights it 
upholds. For instance, it is a matter of justice if we consider the effect 
that nationality tests have in minority groups, or the effects of high 
levels of immigration has in trust and cooperation among citizens. But 
when we ask what kind of political arrangement we need in order to 
accommodate those conflicting claims of justice, we in fact ask how 
we interpret the relative value between cultural homogeneity and 
diversity; between freedom and equality, between order and liberty, 
between security and plurality, and so on. This latest kind of question 
about legitimacy is the kind I think we can and should take on before 
we adjudicate problems of justice. Again, questions about legitimacy 
the Swedish legal and political system. In this case the law will be just, but 
it will not be legitimately exercised over the Nicaraguan people, because 
the implementation is the result of an imposition that failed to abide to any 
procedural requirements of democratic legitimacy. It is not unusual in a liberal 
democracy to regard certain decisions as authoritarian and therefore illegitimate 
despite they could be considered what justice requires. Perhaps that is the case 
when the judiciary changes radically the law without the support of the majority. 
Consider the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education in the USA. It was a 
matter of (procedural) legitimacy that in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Supreme 
Court rejected the claim that practices of segregation familiar in the south of the 
country violated the fourteenth amendment with its “equal protection of the 
laws” clause. The Supreme Court argued that the clause was satisfied provided 
that separate but equal facilities were available. Needless to say that the decision 
enjoyed popular support at the time and states that practiced segregation 
resisted for a long time integration relentlessly. Yet, in 1954 with Brown, the 
Supreme Court unanimously found a way to overturn Plessy regardless of its 
precedent and favour black plaintiffs by banning segregation in schools. It is 
true that many more people found segregation wrong when Brown was decided 
than it had when Plessy was decided. It is also true that Chief Justice Earl Warren 
found a rhetoric way to say that the Court wasn’t really overruling Plessy. But 
it may be true as well that, given the precedent and the popular rejection, the 
legitimacy of this Court´s decision could be challenged, even if there were 
powerful reasons of justice to endorse it. Notice that it could be also argued that 
segregation is illegitimate. But that was precisely wat was at stake in Plessy and 
Brown. Legitimacy in the USA required equal protection of the laws to begin 
with; thus segregation was unjust because it was incoherent with the fourteenth 
amendment. See Dworkin (1986: 29-30). 
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seem somehow more primitive than questions about justice since what 
is morally required seems prior to what is owed, because justice always 
assumes certain cooperative institutional order with a moral character 
which allows the questions of justice to arise (Rawls, 2001: 5-10). 
Before we move on and ask what legitimacy requires from national 
allegiances, recall the different dimensions of legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
not only about what people in fact endorse even if it is wrong.  When we 
assess how well our political institutions and their exercise of political 
power live up to our moral conceptions, we have to deal with legitimacy 
in normative and interpretative ways. Legitimacy is normative when 
it determines what people should accept as morally justified exercises 
of political power. And as opposed to these ideal considerations, it is 
interpretative when it determines what people could accept as justified 
all things considered in their actual circumstances. For instance, as a 
normative matter we can say that states that forbid women to vote should 
be illegitimate. And that is indeed true for liberal democracies here and 
now. But, all things considered, states which forbid votes for women 
were legitimate one century ago. After all, limited voting rights were 
only gained by women in Finland, Iceland, Sweden and some western 
U.S. states in the late 19th century.
This distinction between legitimacy and justice is central because 
nationalism too is a theory of legitimacy. Nationalism may be stated as 
a theory of legitimacy engineered to supplement liberal justice (Miller, 
2008: 375). Both liberal accounts of distributive justice and democratic 
theory begin with the idea of states as units of justice with a fixed set of 
members and a defined territorial dimension (Simmons, 2001: 302). On 
this regard, nationalism attempts to supplement liberalism with a theory 
of nationalist legitimacy, which tries to explain membership in terms 
of nationhood or national identity. For instance, Miller’s account of 
legitimacy provides an answer to the problem of membership: members 
are those who share the same culture. If this account is successful, it 
means that duties of distributive justice are not available as ground for a 
right to immigrate; because the principle of nationality limits the scope 
of distributive duties to the institutions that apply only to members of 
the same nation (Miller, 2005: 198). On this token a liberal democracy 
would be justified in closing its borders and rejecting immigrants as Mr. 
Trump suggests. Then, what does legitimacy require from our national 
allegiances?
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4. Cultural Nationalism as a Theory of Legitimacy.
I think it is worth asking, leaving the regrettable history and bad 
press of nationalism behind: can we reconcile liberal democracy with 
nationalism? Recall liberal democracies are characterized by exercising 
dominion over people from many different cultural and even national 
backgrounds. So, is liberal nationalism compatible with the idea that 
a pluralist state can commit itself, officially (through its constitutional 
arrangements and its public speech) to one of the cultures present in the 
state, provided that it is the culture of the majority?
Note that this is not a question of justice because it does not 
particularly seek to quantify how much concern majorities owe to 
minorities and how much tolerance minorities owe to majorities. Instead 
it is a question about the justification needed when one makes decisions 
in the name of others and one enforces the result of those decisions over 
those in which name one has taken those decisions in the first place. 
Therefore, it is a question of what legitimacy requires from our national 
allegiances.
As we saw, a liberal nationalist says a big ‘YES’ to this question by 
providing a nationalist account of legitimacy. Nationalist legitimacy is 
defined by the requisite function of protecting national culture. Alien 
cultures threaten to change the continuity of national culture (Miller, 
1995: 88). Public policy, including immigration controls12 should be 
worked out with the purpose of establishing the conditions and means 
necessary to secure the continuity and authenticity of national culture 
(Miller, 2007: 221). 
In order to deliver a theory of legitimacy suitable for supplementing 
political liberalism, nationalists that are engaged in the revitalization 
and domestication of nationalism, have to change their ideal or belief 
of supremacy of race and kin with the socially acquired traits of culture. 
If they succeed, nationalist legitimacy would state that members are 
12  Miller concludes that nations have a right to control and restrict 
immigration based on national self-determination (Miller, 1995: 63). Given 
the intrinsic and instrumental value of culture, citizens have a legitimate right 
to control as much as possible the continuity and authenticity of their public 
shared culture. It seems very difficult that people could control the development 
of their culture without the right to restrict immigration (Miller, 2005: 200).
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involved in a special relationship with each other through their own 
national culture, which is worth being protected by national boundaries. 
Common membership is therefore formulated in terms of belonging to 
a group that shares national culture. Common history and language 
are promoted as a way of defending and unifying the nation, which 
embodies a national culture. For this reason, outsiders are legitimately 
excluded as a result of the obligation the state has to protect the national 
culture. So let’s assume that a nationalist state has by its own cultural 
uniqueness a good case of political self-determination based on their 
case of cultural self-determination because context matters, because our 
bonds and allegiances matter. It is the richness of the context in which 
the individual is rooted, that better explains his moral motivations, 
duties and responsibilities (Miller, 2002).
This remark about the influence of context in political philosophy, 
is indeed a powerful statement that must prevent us from theoretical 
dogmatism and illusory generalizations; but I don’t believe it helps 
the case of nationalist state much because, if cultural context matters 
so much, then cultural groups, particularly national minorities, should 
be respected and the state should refrain from imposing in any way 
the culture of the dominant group in the design of any institutions and 
policies. Indeed, the arguments analysed so far do not provide any 
reason about why nationalism of the nation-state should have priority 
over minority nationalism. But suppose still that I’m wrong and a liberal 
democracy does well by submitting its citizens to a process of nation-
building using nationalist culture. I will challenge then whether the 
state should or should not exercise its dominion in the way that affects 
how culture should be shaped, protected and nourished so it could be 
available to socialize the members of the state. So now the question is 
this: Is liberal democracy compatible with nationalist claims of cultural 
self-determination?
Suppose that the government should have a role in protecting and 
nourishing culture. Culture as a whole includes human expression 
of many different kinds as I indicated above. Culture is so vast, that 
the state won’t be able to protect it all. Presumably not all features of 
culture are worthy of protection. If the state or any other centralized 
government institution ought to protect national culture, then it must be 
expected that the government and its officials have a respectable opinion 
about what should be protected or what needs priority. Preservation of 
the culture of the majority cannot work out without finding some way 
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to identify or at least make reasonable judgments about what people 
want to preserve or what is worth preserving. It will be necessary for the 
state to know what is under a threat or what is worthy of protection. It 
will be necessary to decide which means are suitable for exercising that 
protective enterprise. Furthermore, assessing culture might be difficult 
because cultural elements are often a matter of tune and degree, things 
that are difficult to translate into policy (Dworkin, 2001: 228). Therefore, 
for taking those decisions about tune, degree and character the state will 
need to interpret culture. Also, to determine the way to hand-pick what 
they regard as worth preserving in order to focus institutional efforts; it 
will be necessary also to decide what means are suitable for exercising 
this protective enterprise.
Would citizens agree in government selective interpretation? Is it 
desirable that a nationalist state take part of this cultural management? 
Would citizens, even the nationalist ones, endorse government’s selective 
interpretation as legitimate? I believe for the case of liberal democracies, 
there is a prima facie conviction that culture should be authentic. If the 
dominion that the state would exercise over culture involves selective 
interpretation, then any attempt coming from the state to preserve 
cultural integrity and authenticity will paradoxically lead to adopting 
an inauthentic way of life (Waldron, 1995: 101; Scheffler, 2007).
One way to understand what is authenticity and what it demands 
from culture is to recall the familiar contrast between autonomy and 
domination (Dworkin, 2011: 212). All forms of art, most expressions of 
identity and culture as a whole cannot escape influence from others. One 
literary movement always finds inspiration in other past movements. 
We hear some of the most distinctive sounds of Beethoven essayed 
first in one or two concerts from Bach. But if culture has to preserve 
its autonomy and integrity it needs to scape domination, otherwise it 
becomes a form of counter-culture, that is a cultural expression whose 
distinctive character is to eschew one form of cultural subjugation.  
In order to assess whether citizens (even those members of the 
majority) would endorse or not the selective interpretation and 
management of culture as legitimate; it seems that we are in a position 
to add yet another distinction or slice of culture to the ones considered 
before. When political power is exercised in order to establish a 
determined set of core cultural features, with the purpose of establishing 
a socio-political and educational artefact, with cultural management 
purposes as those described before, then it is not working out a public 
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nationalist culture; it is rather tailoring an official nationalist culture. 
This seems to be controversial because it means that one selection and 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the culture of one group or one part of the 
group, is coercively transformed into the culture of the nationalist state.
Consider this other way to make the same point. The main problem 
is that it is not clear how an institution devoted to cultural protection 
could be legitimate. Recall that the concept of legitimacy requires 
political order with a moral character and the conception of legitimacy 
appropriated for liberal democracies requires that the authority of the 
state is publicly justifiable (Rawls, 2000: 12). That means that a legitimate 
liberal democracy must provide the conditions for everyone to be a 
member without losing one’s self-respect and value as a person. It is 
not possible for each citizen to see the government as her government, 
unless the government shows each citizen an equal concern and equal 
respect (Dworkin, 2001: 205). So, given the conditions of pluralism, it 
seems odd that an institution could exercise dominion over people’s 
culture and yet remain justifiable to everyone on those terms. 
But this is too quick. A defender of Substantive Cultural Nationalism 
could object that it is not true that centralized governmental efforts 
to support cultural production and preservation always end up in 
illegitimate expressions of coercion over cultural authenticity, such as 
the so-called official culture. If authenticity is a valuable trait of culture, 
the state could participate in preserving cultural authenticity in national 
culture merely by coordinating efforts and providing financial and 
material support. If this is sound, maybe institutional nationalist culture 
is not always illegitimate and my concerns only amount to important 
risks that the defenders of nationalist culture need to consider. In 
contrast, it seems that my rejection of the Substantive Nationalist State 
leads me to advocate for a tout court institutional withdrawal from 
cultural matters. Does this mean that a liberal democracy has no role to 
play in culture?13
On the contrary the state has stringent obligations regarding culture. 
This means that the state must provide the conditions that will make 
different worth cultural expressions to thrive and prosper (Dworkin, 
2001: 229-233). But the kind of culture over which the state exercises 
legitimate dominion should be a public political culture; this means that 
13  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this objection.
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culture of the nation-state must be in its nature political and civic rather 
than nationalist or in any way morally comprehensive, particularly if its 
citizenry is composed by many cultural groups.
As an exercise of cultural self-determination, the defenders of the 
Substantive Nationalist State are unable to work out an appropriate 
conception of legitimacy for liberal democracies, because to extend the 
culture of the majority over minorities is a form of cultural domination. 
When nationalism ceases to invoke a pre-political culture as a way to 
identify members, and starts to see nationalist culture as a long term 
nation-building project, then it is abandoning its attempt to offer an 
account of legitimacy and instead it is only targeting current members 
with the desired tailored cultural background (Abizadeh, 2012:872). 
This means that the institutional projection of the culture of the majority 
over the rest of the citizenry does not identify members of a pre-
political national demos, it merely coercively acculturates the existing 
members of the society. It is very difficult to reconcile nation building 
projects with the idea of equal concern and respect, especially if treating 
someone with equal concern involves to respect individual authenticity 
and responsibility (Dworkin, 2011).
During this discussion, I hope I have shown that even if majorities 
may have a legitimate interest in controlling and participating in their 
culture; this interest is not equivalent to a right, let alone to having the 
right to become a culturally homogeneous nation-state. Just because it is 
good for people to have something, you cannot say they have the right to 
have it. The upshot is this: Cultural self-determination is not necessarily 
connected with political self-determination. So, when we say that a 
majority should elevate their culture to the nation-state level because 
it is good for them, more justification is needed. The imposition of an 
official nationalist culture is problematic, because centralized cultural 
management seems to take away member’s control over their culture, 
which is at odds with the main motivation of cultural-nationalist of 
preserving member’s control over their culture. That is why this kind of 
institutional protection of nationalist culture is always a form of cultural 
domination.
If this is not convincing for the defender of Substantive Nationalism, 
let me insist on a reason that makes nationalist legitimacy incompatible 
with liberal-democracy. I believe that certain decisions must not be taken 
collectively, but instead should be made individually. A culture, broad 
or nationalist, can be formed, sustained, and protected not collectively 
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but organically as the result of free people making free choices (Dworkin, 
2001: 229-233). But the broad culture, even if it is nationalist in character, 
has no political role to play, at least in a liberal democracy (Habermas, 
1994: 23-25). In contrast, a public political culture (as opposed to broad, 
comprehensive, or official culture) of a legitimate liberal democratic state 
is an artificial structure engendered with the purpose of showing what 
values and virtues we share as members of the political community in 
a way that could appeal to all.  Public political culture must be civic 
in nature, and not nationalist, perfectionist or morally comprehensive, 
particularly if the citizenry is composed by many cultural groups. 
If liberalism has failed in delivering its own support and unity, or if it 
is undetermined regarding the scope and the site of its institutions, that 
does not mean that the best available solution is to engage in romantic 
projects of nation-building. The objective should never be, I hope, to 
eliminate the plurality produced by liberal democracies by substituting 
it with purported tailored nationalist cultures. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I conceptually distinguish concerns of legitimacy from 
concerns of justice. When we ask what justice requires from national 
allegiances we wonder things like how much concern majorities owe to 
minorities regarding the imposition of dominant culture or how much 
tolerance and effort minorities owe to majorities in order to accommodate 
themselves to those requirements. I hope I can show that from that 
perspective only the discussion seems so far inconclusive: it seems 
difficult that liberal values take root without nationalist institutions 
and it seems difficult to respect the rights of minorities without limiting 
nationalist expectations. 
Without pursuing the problem any further I have suggested a 
different manoeuvre. To ask what legitimacy requires from our national 
allegiances in order to deflate the discussion of what justice requires. The 
hope was that by identifying what is illegitimate from nationalist claims 
we could at least eliminate some of the options within the discussion 
from justice. 
I found that the the extension of the dominant culture to the rest of 
society is illegitimate for the case of liberal democracies mainly because 
there is no justified connection between cultural self-determination and 
political self-determination.
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For the nationalist, it seems obvious that the two kinds of self-
determination are connected. But consider an alternative story about 
the relationship between culture and institutions. If being a member of 
a cultural group facilitates a welfare state and deliberative democracy, 
it may not be in virtue of how familiarized each of us is with the 
mainstream culture; but rather it may be in virtue of how open the 
cultural dialogue for every one of us is in the polity. It may be that the 
broad conditions of open participation are what delivers the kind of trust 
and mutual engagement that social justice and deliberative democracy 
demand (Abizadeh, 2002). The virtues of justice and legitimacy are the 
ones that foster cooperation, not the virtues of patriotism and national 
alliance. The problem is that by favouring, if not imposing the culture 
of the majority, nationalists are not making it particularly easy for many 
people to incorporate themselves to the cultural dialogue of the polity.
If the majority protects their culture by isolating it from alien 
influences, then the mainstream culture may be seen as an instrument of 
domination where some people cannot participate without losing their 
dignity. In this case, culture is no longer seen as a common ground where 
everyone can participate in a cultural dialogue. The fact that a majority 
shares the same culture does not seem to justify the transformation of 
a liberal democracy into a nationalist nation-state, in virtue of the fact 
that cultural self-determination and political self-determination are not 
necessarily linked.
Members of the majority are entitled to be collectively in charge of 
their own culture, but that does not necessarily entitle them to wield 
rights of political self-determination. This is because unity, endorsement 
and stability may not necessarily be a result of how successful the 
majority is in offering or imposing their culture to the rest of the 
members, particularly in pluralist, multicultural, multinational liberal 
democracies. Instead, they may be a result of how successful we are all in 
guaranteeing that everyone with interests and talents could participate 
as equals in the everyday construction of our common culture. It may 
very well be true that nationalism is one of the many obstacles that 
liberal democracies may face in order to boost inclusion.
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